

link-up in 48 to 72 hours should be a reasonable objective. Even then, unless adequate cache sites were planned (and were not discovered by the enemy), water and ammunition will almost certainly have to be resupplied by container delivery or helicopter sling loads to forces that are staying behind or conducting an air assault. Stay-behind forces may have to operate without resupply for 7 to 10 days or more. During Team Spirit 88, one rifle company in the 4th Battalion, 22d Infantry, conducted a successful and undetected week-long stay-behind operation supported only by cached Class I and V supplies.

The distances involved in Team Spirit and the rugged terrain of Korea exact a high price in vehicle maintenance. The battalion must receive assistance from the brigade maintenance section, along with a tailored automotive prescribed load list package. With the BSA 30 to 40 kilometers from the FLOT, the goal of fixing equipment as far forward as possible

takes on a new meaning. The battalion combat trains must have on hand glow plugs, spare tires, and control boxes.

This kind of augmentation comes, of course, with its own CSS price tag—the light infantry battalion's logistical structure picks up the additional support requirements.

The major lessons for a light infantry battalion in a mid-intensity conflict that were revealed by our battalion's Team Spirit experience are the following:

- Anticipate the need for and the employment of combat, combat support, and combat service support augmentation forces.

- Plan for time and distance factors imposed by a scenario in which the flow of battle moves more than 20 kilometers a day. The tempo of mid-intensity operations will not allow a unit merely to react to events without severe penalties.

- Plan to support augmentation forces with every class of supply.

- Have a back-up plan and redundant

support systems. If the CDS doesn't fly, how will that element be resupplied?

- Have a good tactical SOP that is broadly understood. Units *will* lose communication, trucks *will* get lost, delays *will* occur. The augmenting units must understand the light infantry battalion's SOPs.

Army doctrine calls its light infantry division a strategically responsive and flexible division that is organized, equipped, and trained to respond to a broad spectrum of contingencies and to reinforce units that are deployed forward. The challenge in a mid-intensity environment is to be aware of the division's limitations and vulnerabilities and to see that it is appropriately augmented.

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Organic Air Defense For A Light Infantry Company

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After serving for two years in a light infantry company, I am convinced that organic air defense is needed at the platoon and company level. The probable areas of deployment for a light infantry company and the nature of its missions make it extremely vulnerable to aircraft on the AirLand Battlefield.

In light infantry battalions today, a great deal of emphasis is put on antiarmor capability. For example, the antitank section in the company headquarters is

made up of six Dragon teams, and these teams often conduct extensive training on the use of the Dragon antiarmor missile. Unfortunately, there are no similar teams to help with air defense.

Yet, in most of the terrain for which the light infantry unit was created, a platoon can run from armor but can find no place to hide if a helicopter gunship shows up. A platoon in this situation could be rendered combat ineffective in a matter of minutes. (A good example of

this is the terrible mauling the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army took at the hands of our coordinated airpower because they had no air defense at the small unit level out in the paddies and the jungle.)

Too, the nature of a light infantry platoon's mission sometimes requires it to operate independently or behind enemy lines. As a result, that platoon leader will not always be able to rely upon higher headquarters to provide him with air



defense when he needs it. In addition, a light infantry platoon must often operate at night, and this makes it vulnerable to enemy aircraft equipped with night vision equipment.

The solution to this problem is to make six Stinger systems available to the company's antitank section and to cross-train the Dragon gunners to fire both weapons. Then, depending on the commander's analysis of METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops available, and time), the platoons could take either the Stingers or the Dragons on a mission, or they could carry a mix of them.

The two weapons are similar in weight. The Stinger weighs 35 pounds and the Dragon, 32 pounds. The Stinger is significantly longer than the Dragon, and may be more awkward to carry in certain types of terrain and vegetation, but it is manportable.

There are several possible arguments against this proposal. The first is that the Stinger teams now found at the division level can be tasked out as a company needs them. The problem is that there are not enough Stinger teams to go around.

A light infantry division has one air defense artillery battalion consisting of two batteries, each with one Stinger platoon. The platoon is divided into four sections with five Stinger crews each. Each Stinger crew is made up of a non-commissioned officer and an enlisted man; they are equipped with a HMMWV (high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle) and a basic load of six missiles. In the portable mode, one man can carry only one missile.

This adds up to 20 Stinger crews for each battery or 40 for the division. These Stingers are usually put in direct support of headquarters or trains locations at the division, brigade, and battalion levels, which leaves few available for use at the company or platoon level. And even if there were enough systems, it would take too long to get them from division to support a platoon's operation.

According to the draft version of TC 44-3 (June 1988), 52 non-dedicated Stinger gunners will be made available to the light infantry divisions. The only problem with this is that all of these Stingers have been allocated to combat

support or headquarters elements. (Twenty of them will go to field artillery units, 18 to military police units, one to each mortar platoon, one to each brigade headquarters, and two to division headquarters.) None have been allocated to the frontline infantry units.

Another argument against the idea of issuing Stingers to a light infantry company is that, in low-to-mid-intensity conflicts, U.S. forces will always have air superiority over the enemy; therefore the companies and platoons will not need any air defense. But this assumption is not completely valid. Some of our potential third-world enemies do have aircraft, including attack helicopters—probably not as many as we have, but enough to do some damage. An enemy observer with a radio can bring aircraft in on a position suddenly, and by the time a unit requests friendly air cover, it may be too late.

In addition, during a light infantry platoon's missions behind enemy lines, friendly air cover would give away its presence.

Still another argument is that it would

be too costly or too difficult to cross-train the company Dragon gunners. Actually, though, the only expensive part would be supplying the missiles themselves. A Stinger missile and launcher costs about \$50,000. As for training, the division Stinger teams could train the gunners, under the direction of the air defense artillery battalion.

The weapon is fairly easy to operate, and tests have shown that it has a kill probability as high as 77 percent. Both the *mujahideen* in Afghanistan and the contra rebels in Nicaragua have used the Stinger successfully. If these people can use the Stinger effectively, I am confident that the U.S. infantryman can also be trained to use it effectively.

The company's Stinger training would certainly have to include training on identifying friendly and enemy aircraft. And since this skill is perishable, the training would need to be done on a recurring basis.

The implications of using Stinger gunners who did not have proper aircraft

identification skills are serious, and doing so could result in the downing of friendly aircraft. One way to reduce this risk would be to place engagement restrictions on the infantry Stinger gunners. For example, the gunners might be allowed to fire *only* at threatening Warsaw Pact helicopters, which are easier to identify than hostile fixed wing aircraft, and which also may be the greatest threat to light infantry. (It is not as easy to distinguish between friendly and hostile fixed wing aircraft.) Although there is an IFF interrogator device that can be attached to the Stinger and used to determine whether an aircraft is friendly, the primary means of identification is visual.

During movement, a light infantry company would not have enough vehicle support to carry the extra missiles or the launchers when the platoons were using them. Therefore, in combat, the missiles would need to be stored at the battalion combat trains under the control of the battalion S-4, the same way the M202 rocket launcher is now stored. This

would be feasible, because the Stingers do not need any special maintenance. The missiles would then be brought forward at a company's request.

In peacetime, each company would need one or two MILES Stinger launchers to use for refresher training. These could be placed under the control of the company armorer and stored in the company arms room.

The Stinger missile system is an effective weapon, and it should be used to its fullest potential. The U.S. Army should make air defense organic to the light infantry company by cross-training its Dragon gunners as Stinger gunners and making the missiles available to them.

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J-Edition Field Trains

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The implementation of the J-Edition modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) has significantly increased the personnel and equipment in the headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) of a mechanized infantry battalion. As a result, operating the company's field trains presents formidable leadership and tactical challenges for an HHC commander.

Unfortunately, when we were assigned to an HHC in 1986, we found there was little "how to" literature on field trains operations. FM 71-2, The

Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (then in draft form but published in September 1988) provided the most useful information on the subject. Further, the recent staffing of ARTEP 7-94-MTP, Infantry Battalion HHC/CS/CSS Platoons, suggests that this shortfall in CSS operations has now been corrected. The ARTEP provides tasks, conditions, and standards for establishing and operating the field trains. This document (to be published in November 1989) should fill the void in this critical area.

In the absence of this kind of help, however, we developed some techniques that helped us meet the challenge. And these techniques can still serve as a "how to" methodology to help HHC leaders meet the standards specified in the new ARTEP.

Although the techniques presented here were developed for use in Korea, the concepts and principles behind them have universal application. If you are a new HHC commander, you should find them at least a good starting point. Even if you are an experienced HHC commander,